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ALL'S FAIR IN LOVE AM PARODY:
ESPECIALLY WHEN A "PRETTY WOMAN" IS AT STAKE!
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994)
Sharon G. Plunkett
I. INTRODUCTION
Fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement, which courts and
legal scholars alike call the most troublesome doctrine in all of copyright law.'
For almost a century, the judicial system grappled with analyzing fair use cases.2
Works which parody an original are especially difficult for the courts to analyze
as a possible fair use. Parodies criticize the original work and are therefore sel-
dom licensed, but their benefit to the public as a critical comment necessitates
their inclusion in the fair use defense to copyright infringement.
In the wake of two fairly recent, and somewhat controversial, Supreme Court
opinions in areas other than parody involving the fair use defense,3 the Court
granted certiorari to review a fair use case involving parody, Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc.4 Parody cases had been causing problems in the courts below,
due in part, to the Court's recent fair use opinions, Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.5 and Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises.' Even though neither one of these cases involved a parody, the
courts below were employing the language of the two opinions to parody cases.
In Sony, the Court noted that a commercial use was presumptively unfair,' and
the lower courts snapped up the dicta. Courts began to place little emphasis on
the standard "four-factor test" and limited the use of parody by emphasizing its
commercially exploitative nature and holding it presumptively unfair.8
The Supreme Court's decision to review Campbell drew widespread attention.
This would be the first opinion ever issued by the Court on parody,9 and the sub-
ject matter was all but ordinary. The notorious rap group "2 Live Crew" had out-
rageously parodied the 1960's hit "Oh, Pretty Woman."'" Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., who owned the copyright to the song, sued the rap group and its production
1. See Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 E2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
2. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 E Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
3. Harper & Row, Publishers., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am., v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
4. 114 S. Ct. 1164(1994).
5. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
6. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
7. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
8. See, e.g., Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y 1990).
9. On the only other occasion in which the Supreme Court reviewed a parody case, no opinion was written
due to a split decision on the bench. See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43
(1958) (per curiam) (aff'g Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956)).
10. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1168 (1994).
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company for copyright infringement, but 2 Live Crew claimed protection for
their version, employing the defense of fair use."
While entertainment and intellectual property lawyers hailed the coming of
Supreme Court guidelines for future parody cases, the entertainment industry
anxiously awaited the outcome. The industry was split, with some viewing paro-
dy as an infringement of their private property rights; on the other side, there
were the various artists and producers who derived a substantial income from
parody. 2 If the Court put a commercial limit on parody, would this be the end of
"Saturday Night Live"?
In addressing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,13 this Note will briefly dis-
cuss the fair use defense and its related history. An overview of the history of
parody in the judicial system will be given, culminating in a discussion of the
recent case, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. This Note will examine the rela-
tive extent to which Campbell articulated useful guidelines for the courts below,
and what issues, if any, with which the lower courts will continue to struggle.
II. FACTS
In 1964, the original, smash-hit rock ballad "Oh, Pretty Woman" was written
and recorded by the late Roy Orbison along with William Dees. 14 It was that
very same year when Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. obtained the rights to this "pop
11. Id.
12. High Court Unanimous for 2 Live Crew, Chi. Trib., March 7, 1994, at 1.
13. 114 S. Ct. 1164(1994).
14. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1168. "Oh, Pretty Woman" as written by Roy Orbison and William Dees:
Pretty Woman, walking down the street,
Pretty Woman, the kind I like to meet,
Pretty Woman, I don't believe you, you're not the truth,
No one could look as good as you Mercy
Pretty Woman, won't you pardon me,
Pretty Woman, I couldn't help but see,
Pretty Woman, that you look lovely as can be
Are you lonely just like me?
Pretty Woman, stop a while,
Pretty Woman, talk a while,
Pretty Woman give your smile to me
Pretty Woman, yeah, yeah, yeah
Pretty Woman, look my way,
Pretty Woman, say you'll stay with me
'Cause I need you, I'll treat you right
Come to me baby, Be mine tonight
Pretty Woman, don't walk on by,
Pretty Woman don't make me cry,
Pretty Woman, don't walk away,
Hey, O.K.
If that's the way it must be, O.K.
I guess I'll go home, it's late
There'll be tomorrow night, but wait!
What do I see
Is she walking back to me?
Yeah, she's walking back to me!
Oh, Pretty Woman.
Id. at 1179, app. A.
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music standard""5 and subsequently registered for copyright protection.1" Acuff-
Rose's right to "Oh, Pretty Woman" has been a continual source of significant
income, from both the original tune and profitable licensing. 7
In 1989, Luther R. Campbell, a member of the rap group 2 Live Crew, wrote a
parody of "Oh, Pretty Woman" through the medium of song. 8 2 Live Crew was
willing to pay the statutory rate to Acuff-Rose for this derivative use of the origi-
nal, but Acuff-Rose adamantly denied the rap group's request for permission to
use Campbell's parody. 9 However, 2 Live Crew believed its parody was a per-
missible use, and went ahead as planned with the inclusion of "Pretty Woman"
on their new release "As Clean as They Wanna Be."2
The 2 Live Crew version properly credited the authors, Orbison and Dees, and
the publisher, Acuff-Rose, on the compact disc itself along with the cover of the
release.21 "As Clean as They Wanna Be" achieved instant success, selling over
250,000 copies before Acuff-Rose expressed its displeasure by bringing a copy-
right infringement suit in federal court.22 The suit was not initiated until 1990,
almost a year after the initial release, and it named both the rap group and its
recording company, Luke Skyywalker Records, as defendants. 3 It was Acuff-
15. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F2d 1429, 1432 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1168 (1994). "Pretty Woman" as recorded by 2
Live Crew:
Pretty Woman, walking down the street,
Pretty woman girl you look so sweet
Pretty woman you bring me down to that knee
Pretty woman you make me wanna be please
Oh, pretty woman
Big hairy woman you need to shave that stuff
Big hairy woman you know I bet it's tough
Big hairy woman all that hair it ain't legit
'cause you look like 'Cousin It'
Big hairy woman
Bald headed woman girl your hair won't grow
Bald headed woman you got a teeny weeny afro
Bald headed woman you know your hair could look nice
Bald headed woman first you got to roll it with rice
Bald headed woman here, let me get this hunk of biz for ya
Ya know what I'm saying you look better than rice a roni
Oh bald headed woman
Big hairy woman come on in
And don't forget your bald headed friend
Hey pretty woman let the boys
Jump in
Two timin' woman girl you know you ain't right
Two timin' woman you's out with my boy last night
Two timin' woman that takes a load off my mind
Two timin' woman now I know the baby ain't mine
Oh, two timin' woman
Oh pretty woman
Id. at 1179-80, app. B.





24. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1151 (1991), revd, 972 E2d 1429 (6th Cir.
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Rose's contention that the rap group was "unfairly ... trying to cash in on the
popularity of 'Oh, Pretty Woman.' "24 In response, 2 Live Crew and Luke
Skyywalker Records filed a motion for summary judgment on the premise that
their "Pretty Woman" was a parody of the original and thus, a fair use according
to 17 U.S.C. § 107 of the Copyright Act."
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
A. Purpose of Copyright Law
The roots of copyright law are buried deep in the traditions of our legal system.
Our society has long recognized that it has a legitimate interest in the arts and in
promoting creativity among individuals. The Constitution, in Article I, Section
8, states "[t]he Congress shall have Power ... to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."26 In 1790,
Congress used this authority to pass the first copyright laws.27 In seeking to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," the purpose of these statutes
was to grant broad incentives for creative works by giving authors financial
incentives and a redress in the courts.2
Although seemingly individualistic, the copyright laws in theory foster the
public good by allowing for private gain.29 "[T]he limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved" and therefore, the creators
gain is a secondary reflection." The creation of new and original works of
authorship significantly shape society and its culture, with copyright laws being
developed for public rather than private benefit.31 Further proof of the public
good theory is that as early as 1790 there were limits on the monopoly given to
authors; after fourteen years, the works fell into the public domain for all to copy
and use as they saw fit. 2
The current policy of the copyright laws is to grant primary and derivative
market protection to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression."3 To prove copyright infringement, the owner of a copyright sim-
1992), rev'd and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
25. Id. at 1152 (citations omitted).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
27. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1848) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010
(1992)).
28. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as a Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax
Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1602 (1982).
29. Brian R. Landy, Comment, The Two Strands of the Fair Use Web: A Theory for Resolving the Dilemma
of Music Parody, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 227, 229 (1993).
30. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
31. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. at 7 (1909).
32. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1848) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010
(1992)).
33. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106 (1992).
34. Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1372 (2d Cir. 1993).
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ply has to establish: (1) she is the valid owner of a copyright and (2) another has
substantially copied the original aspects of the copyrighted work.34 However, the
right to solely use one's own copyrighted material is not exclusive.35 This seem-
ingly broad grant of protection has limitations, one of the most important being
the often confusing and troublesome affirmative defense of fair use. 6
B. The Doctrine of Fair Use
The fair use defense is often asserted by those who partially copy another's
work, in essence claiming they are entitled to a "limited privilege ... to use the
copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the owner's consent."
37
Naturally, conflicts arise when others use copyrighted material without consent,
even though it may actually create a new and socially useful work, or the new
work may be harmless to the original and its derivatives.
The judicial system, early in our nation's history, recognized a need for the bal-
ancing of the legitimate users' interests with the rights of the original creator. In
1841, the Massachusetts Supreme Court articulated the common law doctrine of
fair use in the landmark case, Folsom v. Marsh.38 The court in Folsom held that
the proper analysis of the affirmative defense of fair use was to "look to the
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials
used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the
profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work."39 This common law doc-
trine has played an important role in the fair use defense for over a century.
Congress finally endorsed the common law view by revising the Copyright Act
in 1976, which expressly rejected a "natural rights theory as a premise for copy-
right protection"4 and based copyright law "on a utilitarian foundation of social
benefit."41 Essentially, the Copyright Act of 1976 was a codification of the fair
use defense, with substantial similarities between the common law analysis set
out in Folsom and the four factors codified in section 107 of the Copyright Act
during the 1976 revisions. The statute provides in relevant part:
[T]he factors to be considered shall include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyright-
ed work as a whole; and
35. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118 (1992).
36. See Jay Lee, Note, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music: The Sword of the Parodist is Mightier than the Shield
of the Copyright Holder, 29 US.E L. REv. 279 (1994).
37. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
38. 9 F Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
39. Id. at 348.
40. 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 1.1, at 9 (1989).
41. Id.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).
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(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyright-
ed work. 
42
Although it provides some guidance, the statute has "no real definition"4 3 but
is primarily just a "set of criteria, which though in no case definitive or determi-
native, provide[s] some gauge for balancing the equities."" In codifying the
common law doctrine, Congress stated that it merely intended to restate the judi-
cial fair use principles, and thus was not adding or taking away anything.4
Furthermore, preceding the list of factors in the statute is the language "shall
include."4 This implies that there are other factors which a court may take into
consideration besides those enumerated.
Many courts understood Congress' comments and statutory language to mean
that the judiciary still has wide discretion to analogize the fair use defense in
light of the overall purposes of the copyright laws. It is easy to see why courts
consider the vague and ambiguous fair use doctrine to be "the most troublesome
in the whole law of copyright. 47
C. The Supreme Court and the Fair Use Defense
In the 1980's, the Supreme Court issued two opinions on the fair use defense
which have been greatly utilized by the lower courts.48 The first case, Sony Corp.
of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.," [hereinafter Sony] involved Sony's
manufacture and distribution of Betamax recorders for consumer use."0
Universal Studios, Inc. and Walt Disney Productions sued the Sony Corporation,
alleging vicarious liability for copyright infringement due to Betamax purchasers
recording the plaintiff's audiovisual works for either repetitive or later use."
The Court employed the standard four-factor statutory analysis but focused pri-
marily on the noncommercial aspect of the copying. The decision held that
video recording for noncommercial reasons was a fair use. 2 However, in arriv-
ing at this conclusion the Court stated that "every commercial use of copyrighted
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation" 3 of the rights of the copyright
owner.5 4 Further, the majority concluded that a meaningful likelihood of future
harm to the original's market will be presumed if the use is of a commercial
43. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 65 (1976).
44. Id.
45. H.R. REI. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).
47. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05 (1993) (quoting Dellar v.
Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 E2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939)).
48. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) and Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
49. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
50. Id. at 420.
51. Id. at 420-22.





ALL'S FAIR IN LOVE AND PARODY
nature."5 Sony's emphasis on the commercial nature of a use began to arise in
lower court decisions around the country, especially in parody cases.5 6
In its next term, the Supreme Court issued another opinion on the fair use
defense in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.7 The facts of
this case involved a political magazine's unauthorized publication of verbatim
excerpts of President Ford's unpublished memoirs.5 8 The Court, building on
Sony, emphasized the commercial aspect of the publication and held that the cen-
tral issue was "whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copy-
righted material without paying the customary price."5 9 Furthermore, the Harper
Court placed substantial emphasis on the likelihood of market harm to the origi-
nal or its derivatives, finding this factor was "undoubtedly the single most impor-
tant element of fair use.
60
These two opinions appeared to be shifting the focus from an emphasis on
public benefit to an emphasis on individual gain.
D. Parody as Fair Use
Parody, by definition, comments humorously on the original expression or
work and, in addition, reflects on society-at-large.61 The original work that is the
subject of the parody must be quickly and easily recognized by the intended
audience in order for the comic effect to be successful. Thus, to achieve the
intended effect, the creator of the parody often borrows substantially from the
original.
Parodies are seldom licensed due to their critical nature, and therefore have
often been the subject of copyright infringement cases. Although some form of a
parody case has been adjudicated in almost every circuit, the Second and the
Ninth Circuits have traditionally been the two courts with the most law in the
area of copyright infringement claims involving parodies.
1. The Ninth Circuit Prior to the Sony and Harper Decisions
The first major case involving parody and the fair use defense was Benny v.
Loew's Inc. ,62 decided in 1956. Jack Benny performed a half-hour television bur-
lesque of a popular movie of the times, "Gas Light. '63 Although the routine was
obviously a parody, the court held it was a copyright infringement due to the sub-
56. See, e.g., United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1034 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
57. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
58. Id. at 542.
59. Id. at 562.
60. Id. at 566.
61. Webster's New World Dictionary 1064 (College ed. 1960).
62. 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956).
63. Id. at 533.
64. Id. at 535-37.
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stantial amount of copying. 4 The similarities to the original included the same
local setting, general characters, and story line."5
In Benny, the court declined to view parody as a fair use defense, stating that
parody or burlesque was "to be treated no differently from any other appropria-
tion."66 Therefore, under this analysis, the defendant who parodied an original
must overcome a copyright infringement claim by showing no substantial taking,
and thus, no infringement claim.67
The Ninth Circuit gradually pulled away from the Benny interpretation of paro-
dies. In Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates," the court held that an adult car-
toonstrip, which parodied Mickey Mouse and other Disney characters, was not a
fair use." The court analyzed the parody as an affirmative defense of fair use,
stating the fair use defense may be asserted only if the parody comments at least
in part on the original.70
Congress' express recognition of parody, as a possible fair use defense in the
notes of the 1976 Copyright Act, had already negated the Benny analysis.71
However, the Walt Disney opinion distinguished Benny, without expressly over-
ruling it, stating that it merely stood for a rejection of "near-verbatim copying."72
The court decided to use the analysis employed by the Second Circuit in parody
cases:73 a parodist may only appropriate from the original work that which is
"necessary to 'recall or conjure up' the object of his satire. 74 The court held the
parody of the Disney cartoon had gone too far by copying the characters' essen-
tial features into the strip.75
After Disney, the Ninth Circuit was left with a de minimis standard which sti-
fled parody by only allowing the parodist to copy that which was necessary to
evoke initial recognition from the intended audience. Further, the essential fea-
tures of the original could not be appropriated. This effectively prohibited the
parodist from making the best parody possible.76
2. The Ninth Circuit After Sony and Harper
In 1986, the Ninth Circuit wrote an opinion that closely resembled the future
analysis used by the Supreme Court in the yet to be opinion of Campbell v. Acuff-
65. Id. at 535-36.
66. Id. at 537.
67. Id.
68. 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 756.
71. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986).
72. Walt Disney Prod., 581 F.2d at 757.
73. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
74. Walt Disney Prod, 581 F.2d at 757 (quoting Berlin v. E.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964)).
75. Id. at 757-58.
76. Id.
77. 114 S. Ct. 1164(1994).
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Rose Music, Inc.77 This notable 1986 Ninth Circuit case was Fisher v. Dees,78
which centered around a popular disk jockey's twenty-nine second parody of the
song "When Sonny Gets Blue."79 The disk jockey cut an album that included the
parody, "When Sonny Sniffs Glue."8 The short parody copied the original's first
six bars of music, which was its "recognizable main theme,"81 and the opening
lyrics.2
The Fisher Court held the parody was a fair use of the original.83 In its analy-
sis of the first fair use factor, "purpose and character of the use," the court
employed the Sony presumption, but held that a commercial use need not be
fatal.84 The court held that "the defendant [could] rebut the presumption by con-
vincing the court that the parody does not unfairly diminish the economic value
of the original."8 Since the parody did not supplant demand for the original, it
did not cause any market harm.8"
The opinion also disagreed with the Walt Disney analysis that the "conjure up"
standard was a de minimis standard, and held that parodies of speech and song,
to be effective, would often need to copy the essential elements of the original
with near-verbatim copying. Thus, the Ninth Circuit was left with a much more
lenient standard than before, at least with respect to song and speech parodies,
and there was a sharper focus on the market harm, rather than the commercial
nature of the use.
3. The Second Circuit Prior to Sony and Harper
The Second Circuit traditionally approached parody cases in a sympathetic
manner. The first major parody case in that circuit was Berlin v. E.C.
Publications,88 which involved the notorious "Mad Magazine" and their numer-
ous parodies of various copyrighted songs.89 The court in Berlin recognized that
the social usefulness and the entertainment aspects of parody made it "deserving
of substantial freedom,"90 and thus, became the original articulator of the "con-
jure up"91 standard, stating parodies may be fair use if they copy the elements
needed to "recall or conjure up"92 the original. 3 The opinion also emphasized
78. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).




83. Id. at 440.
84. Id. at 437.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 438.
87. Id. at 439.





93. Id. at 545.
94. Id.
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that the parody had neither the purpose nor effect of supplanting market demand
for the original.94
In Elsmere Music v. National Broadcasting Co.," the Second Circuit addressed
the issue of parody once again. The appellate court gave a brief opinion without
any noteworthy analysis.96 However, by essentially affirming the district court's
analysis it left intact a noteworthy opinion by the Southern District of New
York.
97
The facts evolved around "Saturday Night Live"'s parody of the New York City
advertising jingle, "I Love New York."98 The defendants wrote a short jingle
entitled "I Love Sodom" which made fun of New York's sweet jingle for such a
sinful city.99 The district court used the ordinary approach of analyzing the paro-
dy by using the four statutory factors in section 107, but the court went further
than ever before, articulating a definition of a parody which does not have to
comment on the original."0 Rather, the court opined that a parody could assert
the affirmative defense standard of fair use even when it only commented on
society in general."'
The Elsmere holding, that parody does not have to comment on the original to
invoke a defense of fair use, was short-lived however. In MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,0 2
the Second Circuit held that the Elsmere dicta was incorrect, and that "the copy-
righted song ... [must be] at least in part an object of the parody, [or] there is no
need to conjure it up." ' 3 MCA involved a very lewd, sexual parody of the song
"Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Company B." The court emphasized the bawdy
nature of the song and stated that the mere substitution of dirty lyrics for the
original could not constitute a parody. 4 Since they had as a threshold matter
determined there was no parody to begin with, the court did not need to analyze
the case using the fair use statutory factors.
4. The Second Circuit After the Sony and Harper opinions
In Rogers v. Koons,"°5 the defendant took a copyrighted photograph and essen-
tially copied the picture verbatim into a pop-art sculpture, for the purpose of
commenting on the banality of life.1" The Second Circuit held that the sculpture
was not a parody of the original, and thus under the holding of MCA could not be
a fair use." 7 The opinion stated that this determination was irrelevant though,
95. 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
96. Id.
97. Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.. at 746.
101. Id.
102. 677 E2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
103. Id. at 185.
104. Id.
105. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1991).
106. Id. at 303-06.
107. Id. at 310.
108. Id. at 309-10.
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since under Sony the work was presumptively unfair anyway due to its commer-
cial nature.1"8 Thus, the Sony dicta was at work again.
IV PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 9 the summary judgment motion and
the issues it raised related to parody had not previously been evaluated in the
Sixth Circuit.1 ' Thus, the federal district court for the Middle District of
Tennessee, in deciding the case, was without controlling case law on the major
issues presented."' The court decided to evaluate the summary judgment motion
by using opinions from the two circuits with the most developed law on the sub-
ject of parody, the Second and the Ninth Circuits."'
Using these opinions for interpretation and analytical guidance, the court ana-
lyzed the motion by applying and balancing the four factors set out in section
107 of the Copyright Act." 3 Based on the substantial evidence presented by both
parties during the summary judgment proceedings, the district court determined
the " 'facts [were] sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory factors' ""' and
thus the issue of fair use was proper for the court to decide as a question of
law.'1
5
The district court held the rap song, "Pretty Woman," was a fair use of the orig-
inal "Oh, Pretty Woman," and granted the defendant's motion, thereby dismissing
the case." 6 In reaching their decision, the court heavily weighed the first factor
outlined in the fair use statute, "purpose and character of the use '""7 The court
held the purpose of "Pretty Woman" was to parody the original by comment and
critique, thereby demonstrating "how bland and banal the Orbison song seems to
them.""' 8 Furthermore, due to the nature of parody and its social usefulness, the
court decided "Pretty Woman" was "'deserving of substantial freedom.' """
However, the analysis did not end there. The court also discussed the other
three statutory factors and decided the only factor which favored the plaintiff,
Acuff-Rose, was the second factor, "nature of the copyrighted work."'20 As a
creative, original, and published work, Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman," deserved
a higher degree of protection than works of non-fiction. 2'
109. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), revii, 972 E2d 1429 (6th
Cir. 1992), rev 'd and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
110. Id. at It53 n.1.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1154-59.
114. Id. at 1153 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (quoting
Pacific and S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 n.8 (11 th Cir. 1984))).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1158-59.
117. Id. at 1154-55.
118. Id. at 1155.
119. Id. at 1154 (quoting Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 E2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
822 (1964)).
120. Id. at 1155-56.
121. Id. at 1155.
122. Id. at 1156-58.
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The court held the third and fourth factors of the analysis weighed in favor of
the defendants.122 The third factor examined "the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole."'23 The court
held that although the two works did have substantial similarities, 24 the appropri-
ation was not excessive "[i]n view of the fact that the medium [was] a song, its
purpose [was] parody, and.., the copying [was relatively brief]."'25 In evaluat-
ing the fourth factor, the "effect on the market," the court declined to consider
any adverse economic impact to the original's market due to the parody's critical
nature, noting that " 'biting criticism [often] suppresses demand.' "126 Instead,
the court focused on whether or not a consumer desiring to listen to the original
was likely to purchase the parody instead.2 7 The court held that given the
intensely different nature of the intended audiences, 2 Live Crew's rap parody
"Pretty Woman" was highly unlikely to have any noteworthy effect on either the
present or potential market for the original.
28
The plaintiff, Acuff-Rose, appealed, and the appellate court for the Sixth
Circuit reversed the district court's decision and concluded, as a matter of law,
that 2 Live Crew's parody was not a fair use of the original copyrighted "Oh,
Pretty Woman."'' 29 The appeals court held that three of the four factors favored
the plaintiff, not the defendant as the district court determined.'
Although the court briefly analyzed all four factors, the majority's decision
rested primarily on excerpts taken from Sony and Harper. The appeals court
reiterated the majority's point, in those two decisions, that " 'every commercial
use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monop-
oly privilege belong[ing] to the owner of the copyright.' ""'' The appeals court
also differed widely from the district court on its analysis of the quantity of the
amount copied. The majority held that the parody erred in taking the heart of the
original and thus, copied substantially more than was needed "to conjure up the
original."' 1 2 The appeals court summed up its analysis by holding the "blatantly
commercial purpose of the derivative work. . . prevents this parody from being a
fair use."133
The dissent in the appeals court opinion took issue with the emphasis the
majority had put on the parody's "commercial nature."'3 4 The dissent opined that
the Supreme Court cases cited by the majority dealt with mechanical commercial
123. Id. at 1156.
124. Id. The court noted the parody copied the original by using the original's name, key lyrics, bass guitar
refrain, melody, chorus, and opening drum beat. Id.
125. Id. at 1157.
126. Id. at 1158 (quoting Fisherv. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437-38 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 E2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 1992).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1437 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (quoting
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984))).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1439.
134. Id. at 1443 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
135. Id.
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copying, and that the presumption of unfairness in commercial use should not be
applied outside of those limits. 3 ' Thus, the dissent contended that a parody,
which is a "new and transformed work,"' 36 has a legitimate and substantial bene-
ficial use which the public should not be denied.
137
V INSTANT CASE
The defendants, 2 Live Crew and Luke Skyywalker Records, appealed the
appellate court's decision, and the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari. 38
The petitioners, 2 Live Crew and Luke Skyywalker Records, based their argu-
ment to the Supreme Court on the "undue weight [given] to the Sony/Harper &
Row comment," '139 and on the "[in]sufficient weight [given] to 'parody' as a
genre which necessarily imitates, copies and borrows in order to criticize, satirize
and entertain."' 40
Although the Supreme Court had previously addressed the affirmative defense
of fair use in various contexts throughout history, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc.4" was the first occasion on which the Court issued an opinion directly relat-
ed to parody. 42 The Court spoke unanimously on the issues presented, holding
that "a parody's commercial character is only one element to be weighed in a fair
use enquiry, and ... insufficient consideration was given [by the appellate court]
to the nature of parody in weighing the degree of copying."'' 43 The appellate
court's decision was reversed and remanded for further consideration in light of
the Supreme Court's holding on parody as a fair use. 44
Prior to analyzing the "Pretty Woman" case by the customary four factor test
of section 107 of the Copyright Act, the Supreme Court delved into the history of
the fair use doctrine and its common law roots. 4 ' The conclusion was that
Congress, by making the common law doctrine statutory, intended to " 'permi[t]
courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when... it would stifle
the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.' ""4 The majority opinion
emphasized the need for a case-by-case analysis in all fair use cases, which
should be analyzed using the section 107 examples for general guidance and not
as limitations.'47 The Court commented on the four statutory factors outlined in
section 107, noting that when applying the fair use analysis, those factors should
not be "treated in isolation"'48 but balanced together "in light of the purposes of
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
139. See Brief for Petitioner at 5, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
140. Id.
141. 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
142. See supra note 9.
143. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1168.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1170 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
147. Id. at 1170-71.
148. Id. at 1171.
149. Id.
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copyright."'49 Further emphasis was also placed on the congressional intent to
merely restate the fair use doctrine, thus courts should "continue the common
law tradition"'' 0 and use historical case law on the matter in addressing the issues
on a "case-by-case basis. ' ' 5 '
The majority opinion included an evaluation of each of the four factors in light
of the issues commonly presented with parodies, and more specifically with this
particular parody of Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman."15 2 In discussing how courts
should analyze the first factor, "'purpose and character of the use,"' the majority
looked to both the section 107 examples of criticism, comment and news report-
ing, and to the prior case law on fair use.5 3 This examination led the court to
decide that the purpose of the first factor was to take into consideration how
"transformative"'' 5 4 the use is, by finding out to what extent it "adds something
new, with a further purpose or different character"'' 55 than the original. 56 The
majority concluded that in light of the goals and purposes of copyright law, the
"purpose and character" factor should be approached by employing a balancing
approach; "the more transformative the new work, the less will be the signifi-
cance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of
fair use."'
51 7
In further discussing the first factor, the Court, in a somewhat admonishing
tone, held that the appellate court erred by "ostensibly cull[ing] from Sony"' 6 the
presumptive unfairness approach to commercial uses.5 9 The Court distinguished
Sony and said the proper focus should be on the context in which the fair use was
employed, thus reiterating a balancing approach to the commercial nature. 60
The Court next applied an analysis of the "purpose and character of the use" to
parody in general, then to the 2 Live Crew parody.' The finding was that paro-
dy is similar in nature to comment and criticism, providing various public bene-
fits, and thus may be considered a fair use. 62 The majority declined however to
raise parody to a presumptive fair use status, reasoning that "parody, like any
other fair use, has to work its way through the relevant factors, and be judged
case-by-case, in light of the ends of the copyright law."' 63
In the examination of parody in general, the Court distinguished parody from
satire, which does not really take aim at the original. 64 Parody, unlike satire, has
150. Id. at 1170.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1171-78.
153. Id. at 1170.
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162. Id. at 1171.
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165. Id.
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to copy the original in order to be able to comment or criticize.1"' Emphasis
should be placed on the parodist's need to "at least in part, commen[t] '' 166 on the
original work, implying that the more the parody comments, the more transfor-
mative it is.'67 However, if the parody only "loosely targets""' the original, it
was determined that this was not to be dispositive but merely a factor to be bal-
anced with the other three factors of section 107.169
The Court then looked to 2 Live Crew's "Pretty Woman," and held that the
song was a parody which could reasonably "be perceived as commenting on the
original or criticizing it, to some degree. ' 17' The parody was phrased as one that
"juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes true, with
degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal
responsibility."17 The Court declined to address any issues presented concerning
the vulgar nature of the song, holding it was irrelevant whether or not the parody
was performed in good or bad taste.
1 72
The majority gave a cursory review of the second factor, the " 'nature of the
copyrighted work,' " and decided it was not very helpful in parody cases, "since
parodies.., invariably copy publicly known, expressive works. 1 73 However, the
Court thoroughly analyzed the third and fourth factors, producing more guide-
lines for courts to go by in their analysis of fair use and parody cases. Most
notably, the third and fourth factor guidelines are very important, since they are
the factors which the trial court will consider on remand.
In the analysis of the third factor, " 'the amount and substantiality of the por-
tion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,' " the opinion empha-
sized that the first factor was inextricably intertwined with the third factor since
the extent to which the use may copy the original was based on the use's purpose
and character. 74 The third factor was also related to the fourth, since the degree
of copying often has an effect on the market. 171
In applying the third factor to the facts of the instant case, the Supreme Court
held that the appellate court failed to give adequate consideration to the "difficult
case"' 17 6 of parody. 77 The reason parody presented difficult issues was because it
necessarily had to " 'conjure up' "1l78 enough of the original "to make ... its crit-
ical wit recognizable"1 79 and thus it often takes "the original's most distinctive or
166. Id. at 1172.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1172 n.14.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1173.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1167.
174. Id. at 1175.
175. Id.
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memorable features."'18 The majority expressly held that by copying the opening
line and opening bass riff, the parody had merely done its job of taking aim at the
heart of the original."' It was suggested that this ruling was primarily based on
the fact that not only did the parody copy the heart of the original, but it also sig-
nificantly departed from it thereafter, using different lyrics, and various rap tech-
niques.18 2 However, the opinion left it open for the district court to decide on
remand whether or not the music was excessively copied, especially as to the rep-
etition of the bass riff.
18 3
In the discussion of the fourth factor, " 'the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work,' " the Court held that the proper
inquiry must focus on the likelihood of harm to both the original and derivative
markets. 8 4 The opinion repeated the district court's assertion that any harm
based on the effect of the parody's criticism on either the original or any deriva-
tive is irrelevant, and only when the parody " 'usurps' "185 the demand for the
original or a derivative could there be any recognizable harm. 86 The majority
again cited the erroneous analysis of the appellate court decision, and held that
no across-the-board presumptions arise due to the commercial nature of the paro-
dy.'87 They noted that market harm and the commercial nature of the parody are
just factors to consider, and are" 'sensitive [to the] balancing of interests.' "188
The Supreme Court even went a step further and asserted that it was unlikely
that a parody, in its "pure and simple" 89 form, would have any effect on the mar-
ket for the original.19 The two versions "usually serve different market func-
tions,"19 ' and the theory that it harms the original's ability to market its own paro-
dy will not stand due to the substantial unlikelihood that one will market a criti-
cism of its own work..92
However, the majority recognized that it was simplifying the situation by this
analysis since "2 Live Crew's song comprises not only parody but also rap music,
and the derivative market for rap music is a proper focus of enquiry. 193 Since
neither Acuff-Rose nor 2 Live Crew submitted any evidence on the issue of harm
to the derivative market for a "nonparody, rap version of 'Oh, Pretty Woman,' '"94





183. Id. at 1176-77.
184. Id. at 1177.
185. Id. at 1178.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1177.
188. Id. at 1177n.21.
189. Id. at 1177.
190. Id.




195. Id. at 1178-79.
196 H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 65 (1976),reprintedin 1976 U.SC.C.A.N. 5659, 5678. The
[VOL. 16:1
ALL'S FAIR IN LOVE AND PARODY
VI. ANALYSIS
As the entertainment world awaited the decision in Campbell, most people
probably felt certain the Supreme Court would hold that parody was deserving of
fair use in some instances. There was little doubt as to the resolution of that
issue, since Congress had spoken affirmatively on the issue in its committee
notes of the Copyright Act of 1976.196 However, the current trend in parody
cases was alarming to those in the entertainment industry, since the growing lim-
itations on parody were somewhat stifling. It would be difficult to compose a
great parody if one had to be overly concerned with how much she could appro-
priate, and further parodies would essentially vanish if the creators were prevent-
ed from commercially exhibiting their works. It is obvious that without a finan-
cial incentive, people would not be as prolific with parodies.
The Supreme Court decision in Campbell eased the minds of many. With the
belated demise of the Sony presumption that all commercial uses were unfair and
the Court's recognition of the parodist's need to copy the essence of the original,
those who favored parody breathed a sigh of relief. However, the media's incor-
rect assertion that the Supreme Court had given parody an exemption from copy-
right infringement may have caused many to overlook the real meaning of the
opinion.[197] This analysis will discuss how the opinion both broadens and lim-
its the protection for those who parody the work of another.
A. What is a Parody?
Prior to Campbell, most of the lower courts' decisions did not center on the
issue of whether the work was actually a parody. 98 Typically, if the courts were
going to give the parody the death-knell, they did so by focusing on either the
excessive copying of the original or the commercially exploitative nature of the
work.199 However, the Supreme Court addressed the issue, "what is a parody," in
Campbell.200 Since under Campbell's reasoning, the proper focus is on the con-
text in which the fair use was utilized, a proper analysis should be able to define
that context.
The Court defined parody as a work which could reasonably be perceived as
commenting on or criticizing the original work in some aspect.0 1 However, this
narrow definition gives courts in future parody cases wide latitude to hold that a
use is not even a parody. The Court noted that a satire, which comments on soci-
ety rather than an artistic work, should not be granted as much wide latitude
committee notes stated that an example of fair use was when the original was used in a parody. Id.
197. Linda Greenhouse, Ruling on Rap Song, High Court Frees Parody from Copyright Law, NY Times,
March 8, 1994, at A], A18.
198. See contra, MCA v. Wilson, 677 E2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
199. See supra notes 73 through 75 and accompanying text; see also notes 107 and 108 and accompanying
text.
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since there is little justification for the copying in those instances." 2 Therefore a
satire, unlike a parody will not be able to copy the heart of the original and claim
fair use.
The problem with this distinction is its workability."3 By requiring the parody
to comment on the original at least in part, courts will now have to examine the
motives behind the parodist and try to determine the purpose of the parody. This
gives the judiciary wide latitude to determine that the creator's purpose was to
satirize society and not the original work, thus letting the limitations on excessive
copying slip back into the analysis.
Further, this may pose a problem by allowing generational or cultural bias to
figure into the analysis.20 4 Often what one generation or culture may perceive as
a comment on the original, another group may view as just a comment on soci-
ety. Since any given work may have a myriad of meanings to many different
people, it would be very difficult for the court to understand just what exactly is
being parodied.
B. The Demise of the Sony Presumption
The demise of the Sony presumption that all commercial uses were unfair is
the one aspect of the opinion that gives the parodist great justification to rejoice.
The one thing that is now clear is that "commercialization is only one element in
the fair use inquiry, and [is] by no means conclusive.""2 Courts may still weigh
the commercial aspect of a parody, however, they will no longer be holding that a
parody is presumptively unfair due to its commercial nature. in Campbell, the
Supreme Court correctly focused on the effect of the parody and not the purpose
behind its creation. If the parody comments on or criticizes the original, then
society is enhanced by this broadening of its perspective. Even if the creator
behind the parody did so with the intent to commercially exploit his work, the
effect on society is not diminished.
However, the Supreme Court does not leave the owner of the copyright to the
original work out in the cold. There will still be limits on the commercial aspect
of parodies since the Court placed considerable emphasis on the market harm to
the original and its derivatives.20 6 Thus, the parodist must be able to prove that
his version is unlikely to cause any future harm to the market for the original or
its derivatives. The risk of harm to the original market is seldom an issue, since a
parody virtually never supplants the demand for the original.20 7 The market harm
to the original is generally caused by the parody's critical nature, and as the
203. Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me? Notes on Market Failure and the Parody Defense in
Copyright, 21 AM. INT'L INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS'N, Q.J. 305,311 (1993).
204. For a thorough review of the issue of cultural bias, see Nels Jacobson, Note, Faith, Hope & Parody:
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, "Oh, Pretty Woman" and Parodists'Rights, 31 Hous. L. REv. 955 (1994).
205. Bruce P. Keller et al., As Satiric as They Wanna Be: Parody Lawsuits under Trademark and Copyright
Laws, C962 ALI-ABA 151, 158 (1994).
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Supreme Court points out, that type of harm is justified, and therefore
irrelevant.208
Whether or not the parody effects the market for the derivative, will depend on
the nature of the parody. The Supreme Court in Campbell remanded the case to
the lower court to determine what effect, if any, 2 Live Crew's rap parody would
have on the derivative market of the original." 9 Since the parody involves a dif-
ferent form of music, there is a chance that there could be market harm to the
copyright owner's ability to market a rap version of the original. The main issue
on remand will thus be whether or not the rap parody would supplant or usurp
the demand for a regular rap version of the original.
C. Copying the Essence of the Original
The creators of parody will no longer have to be overly concerned with exces-
sive copying of the original. The Supreme Court articulated a standard which
essentially allows the parody to copy the essence and heart of the original, as
long as the parody has some transformative elements. 10 A parody is rarely a ver-
batim copy of the original, and thus, the Court's opinion substantially frees the
parodist from prior restraints on copying.211
Parody is beneficial to society, adding new perspectives to life by displaying
various original works in a different light than as portrayed by the initial creator.
2 Live Crew's parody enables society to see the perspective of a different culture
on the issue of romance and women on the street. In order for society to gain
maximum benefit from this parody, the author needs to be able to create the best
parody possible. Thus, it is proper for the courts to allow the taking of the heart
of the original. Otherwise, society might not be able to grasp the parodist's criti-
cal perspective of the original.
VII. CONCLUSION
The common law fair use defense was designed to balance the interests of
those who legitimately copy another's work with the interests of the copyright
owner. In keeping this balance, it is important to remember the underlying pur-
pose of copyright law to facilitate the free-flow of ideas, expressions, and various
works of art. In Campbell, the Supreme Court vindicated the rights of the paro-
dist, and made a heroic attempt to rescue the realm of copyright law from the
individual and place it where it belongs, in the hands of society. The Court gave
parodists substantial freedom to copy from the original and successfully buried
the Sony presumption. In the future, copyright holders will probably think twice
before they decide to instigate litigation over a parody which really has no eco-
nomic effect on their market.
209. Id. at 1178.
210. Id. at 1176.
211. Lee, supra note 36.
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